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Support for Developing Country Governments
in the Negotiation of Complex Contracts
Background Paper*
INTRODUCTION
From time to time, all countries need to negotiate complex contracts with major private investors,
suppliers and contractors. The most important and complex are often investment contracts related
to natural resource and infrastructure projects. These investments can last for many decades and
involve issues relating to sharing of economic rent between the investor and host government as
well as significant environmental and social impacts. These contracts are, for many countries, an
important means of generating funds to drive economic growth, development and prosperity.
However, despite their critical importance, many developing country governments negotiate
contracts that fail to maximize the benefits for their country.
The issue of support for developing country governments in complex contract negotiations was
discussed at a workshop held in Berlin in October 2011, organized by the Humboldt-Viadrina School
of Governance and the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment. The 2011
workshop brought together a number of important actors involved in or with knowledge of
developing country negotiations, including government officials, representatives of major investors,
lawyers involved in contract negotiations, representatives of existing initiatives providing
negotiation support, members of civil society and academics. There was consensus among
participants at that workshop about the need for an expansion of support for developing countries
in their contract negotiations, and that such support should include the involvement of lawyers,
financial and fiscal analysts, environment/climate experts, geologists/mining experts, business
strategists, and political risk experts.
A follow-up workshop is taking place on July 18 and 19, 2012, in New York. The purpose of this
follow-up workshop is to assess the need and demand for negotiation assistance; to undertake a gap

*

This paper was prepared jointly by the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC)
and the Humboldt-Viadrina School of Governance (HVSG). The report was authored by James Bond
(coordinator), Jacky Mandelbaum, and Antje Kunst, with help from Kari Lipschutz. Research was primarily
carried out by Jacky Mandelbaum of VCC and Antje Kunst of HVSG. The paper was overseen by a Steering
Committee composed of Joe Bell, Sven Biermann, James Bond, Natty Davis, Peter Eigen, Paul Jourdan, Antje
Kunst, Jacky Mandelbaum, Barry Metzger, Akere Muna, Lisa Sachs, Karl P. Sauvant, Christopher Sheldon,
Perrine Toledano, and Lou Wells.
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analysis between such demand and existing sources of support and to assess a number of innovative
alternative approaches (both existing and proposed). Based on these analyses, the participants at
the workshop will explore, at a preliminary level, whether and if so what type of potential
mechanisms, tools and innovative solutions can usefully be provided to make comprehensive
support available to enable developing country governments to secure the best possible deals.
This background paper has been prepared for the follow-up workshop. It spells out, for the purpose
of guiding discussions rather than as an exhaustive list, the nature and scope of developing
countries’ needs for support (Section I); the existing sources of support (Section II); the missing
elements and challenges to address to fully meet these needs (Section III); and some possible
options for delivering additional support (Section IV). While commercial contracts are often fraught
with complexities for both the private contracting party and the government, the research
underlying this paper focused mainly on contracts relating to investment projects.

Methodology
The material for this background paper was obtained based on the outcomes of the Berlin workshop
(attended by 36 participants, representing home and host countries, multilateral and bilateral
organizations, civil society, the private sector and academia), desk research and over 30 targeted
telephone interviews with key stakeholders with experience in complex negotiations in Africa, Asia,
Latin America, Europe, Australia and North America. Stakeholders included officials from developing
country governments, representatives of the initiatives described in Section II, and other experts
involved in a range of complex contract negotiations, particularly with developing countries.
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I. DEVELOPING COUNTRY NEEDS FOR NEGOTIATION SUPPORT
This section will review the needs of developing countries for support in their contract negotiations
and identify the types of support needed.

A.

Reasons for sub-optimal contracts
Developing country governments face a number of challenges in negotiating complex deals across a
range of sectors. It is important to understand these challenges and the exact problems faced in
order to design appropriate solutions.
The chief cause of poorly negotiated deals is generally resource constraints – limited financial,
technical and human resources - on the part of developing country governments. Government
officials may lack specialized know-how, technical expertise and experience in negotiating complex
contracts. This is compounded by problems of high staff turnover in key agencies and difficulties
attracting or retaining qualified and experienced staff due to salary differentials vis-à-vis the private
sector.1 As a result government negotiators may have limited or no experience with negotiating
similar deals and a limited understanding of the fiscal and other options available to them.
Other causes of poorly negotiated deals may include:
•

asymmetry of information with respect to economic variables of the transaction and
relevant fiscal and legal tools;

•

time pressure from external donors and companies to conclude negotiations;

•

weak governance;

•

the desire, for political purposes, to manage transactions independently rather than seek
external support;

•

poor and incoherent legal and regulatory frameworks, e.g., lack of coherence in fiscal
legislation such as mutually inconsistent tax laws;

•

internal competition among different ministries to influence the outcome of the negotiation
process2; and

•

corruption on the part of government officials in charge of negotiating contracts - the
secretive nature of many deals and the lack of transparency and public scrutiny provide
opportunities for abuse and corruption.3

Large companies, on the other hand, will generally have superior means to carry out their side of the
negotiation, both in terms of in-house resources and the ability to engage external firms as
necessary. Companies also generally have a more coherent negotiation strategy and end goals. They
may use loopholes in the legal and regulatory frameworks and information asymmetries to their
short-term advantage, but at the cost of a less robust contractual relationship overall.4
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B.

Impacts of sub-optimal contracts
Poorly conceived and negotiated contracts not only prevent a country from enjoying the full long
term benefits of its resources, but can entrench poverty, corruption and even conflicts, particularly
when governance systems are inadequate. The impacts of sub-optimal investment contracts are farreaching, especially if their duration extends over several decades, including: substantial loss of
public revenue; natural resource degradation and depletion; loss of access to resources for local
communities; and the non-achievement of larger development goals of a country (e.g. poverty
reduction).5 Negative impacts may also include the temporary or permanent displacement of people
without proper consultation and compensation and environmental damage or disturbance that can
adversely impact food supply, water supplies, and livelihoods.6
It is highly likely that host countries will seek to renegotiate the terms of poor or unfavorable
contracts, either because the conditions existing at the time the original terms are agreed have
changed (as it is almost inevitable that these long-term deals will undergo “fundamental changes” at
least once in the course of their existence7) and/or because it becomes clear to the host country
government with time that the terms of the contract were not sufficiently beneficial (often after an
outcry from host communities or civil society). Indeed, evidence points to a significantly greater
frequency of renegotiations in cases where the initial contracts are unbalanced, poorly drafted, or
inflexible to changing economic circumstances.8 In this respect, the number of renegotiations that
have taken place with regard to infrastructure projects has been particularly high.9 Renegotiations
are costly for host country governments. Even where the reason for renegotiating is an attempt to
redress what was a manifestly inequitable deal, the host country’s reputation vis-à-vis investors will
likely be tarnished as a result and it will have lost potential benefits over the initial period of the
contract. Further, host country initiated renegotiations may trigger international arbitration which
can be extremely costly for governments, not only in terms of the size of the potential awards but
also in legal fees and reputational damage, regardless of the outcome of the case. Indeed, the
number of international investment or commercial arbitration disputes before arbitration tribunals
has increased substantially in recent years.10
It is therefore important for developing country governments to be in a position to negotiate strong
deals at the outset, maximizing the impact of the investment for the benefit of the country as well
as, if possible, providing flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances without the need to invoke
contested renegotiations. Creating a strong deal at the outset, from the perspective of both the
investor and the host country, may minimize the risk that the deal is revisited.

C.

Types of contracts
Complex contracts can include natural resource contracts (e.g. mining, oil and gas, forestry
concessions, commercial fishing rights, agriculture concessions), infrastructure contracts
(construction, operation and/or management of large infrastructure) and other investment and
commercial contracts (e.g., textile plants that import raw cotton and export textiles, or aluminum
smelters that import bauxite and export aluminum). These contracts define the terms of an
investment project, allocate risks between contracting parties, and determine profit sharing, as well
as the scope of the costs and benefits for each party. In countries with weak legal systems, contracts
can be very detailed, dealing with a broad range of issues in order to compensate for inadequate
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and outdated legislative and regulatory frameworks. They can also constitute the key instrument for
the governance of the investment over its lifetime. Complex contracts, within this wide landscape,
vary widely in their structure, level of detail, linkages to existing legislation and economic
parameters.
Contracting norms differ substantially across a range of regions, sectors and contracts. The process
by which the government and private contracting party arrive at an agreement varies - by sector, by
nature of the investment, and according to whether it is competitive or first-come first-served.
Accordingly, the type of support required will differ from contract to contract. There may be
significant differences in the potential source of funds for engaging assistance for various types of
contracts; for example, with respect to infrastructure agreements, the presence of third party
financing can provide an immediate source of funds which brings the possibility of paying counsel,
with the cost of the government’s legal counsel being wrapped into the project sponsor’s costs
(which are ultimately covered, in a certain proportion, by a financing entity). The presence of the
financing entity creates certain restraints, some beneficial and some not so beneficial. Although
third party financing may be involved in the case of natural resource concessions, it is not common
at the stage of closing the deal and there are no contractual guarantees of cost recovery.

D.

Different phases in preparing and negotiating contracts
A number of different steps are involved in preparing and negotiating an investment contract. As is
evident from the discussion above, these vary from country to country, sector to sector, and in some
cases investment to investment. Each of these steps may involve a wide range of skills, requiring
different types of assistance. A description of the goals of each step and the types of support needed
is elaborated in Annex I. Some of these skills are listed in Section I.E below.
For the purposes of this paper, these steps have been divided as follows:
Setting the Investment Environment:
(Non project-specific)
• Formulating government policies and strategies
• Reforming legislative and regulatory frameworks
• Conducting sector-wide analyses
Pre-negotiation phase:
(Project-specific)
• Conducting/reviewing project feasibility and other studies
• Conducting/reviewing environmental and social impact assessments
• Preparing tender documents (where the contract is granted through a competitive process)
• Preparing model contracts
• Managing the tendering process
• Preparing financial structure
Negotiation phase:
• Assembling a multi-disciplinary negotiation team
• Preparing the negotiation position
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•
•
•

Developing negotiation strategy
Negotiating the contract
Drafting and reviewing contractual provisions

Contract implementation phase:
• Monitoring to ensure contract compliance

E. Skills and the nature of external support
The range of skills sets needed to successfully conclude a complex negotiation includes, inter alia,
the following:
•

Project development

•

Sector and project economics

•

Legal (both sector-specific and broader financial, fiscal, commercial)

•

Financial analysis and modeling

•

Financial structuring

•

Sector-specific expertise (e.g. geology, infrastructure, industry)

•

Environment, social impacts and human rights

•

Occupational health and work safety

•

Governance (e.g. anti-corruption/stakeholder engagement)

•

Fiscal and tax management

•

Tendering and procurement

•

Accounting and financial reporting

•

Negotiation strategy

Some of these skills may be available within the administration, e.g. fiscal and tax management,
tendering and procurement etc., while others may not.
Where skills are not available internally, the government can choose between acquisition and
retention through capacity building, or to outsource as technical assistance. Retaining scarce skills
within the administration has proven to be difficult in many countries including industrialized ones,
either because of rapid skills obsolescence or through staff turnover as trained civil servants move to
other departments or leave for the more attractive salaries in the private sector. In some cases,
specialized government bodies have been created (e.g. the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate) which
are able to pay private sector salaries outside the civil service pay scales, to favor retention.
Moreover, an important question that governments need to consider is whether it is more effective
to develop skills in-house, or to outsource them to some extent on the basis that these large scale,
complex negotiations do not take place frequently so it may not be realistic or efficient to try to
develop the skills in-house in every ministry that may need to negotiate such contracts.
•

Capacity building is often a long-term, continuing process, building sustainable technical
capacity and other skills of government officials to do the job themselves. Capacity
building also involves the development of skills of government officials to identify needs
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for external technical experts, procure their services (including conducting the
consultant selection process), contract and manage outside experts, and monitor
outcomes of their services.
•

Technical Assistance involves in most cases the short term contracting of experts with
relevant skills/knowledge to assist with specific functions in lieu of government officials.

F. Willingness of governments to seek support
The telephone interviews with government officials, advisers and international experts gauged the
willingness of governments to accept external negotiation advice. These interviews revealed general
willingness when such advice is really needed, e.g. for activities such as the preparation of feasibility
studies during the period leading up to negotiations, to provide expert advice during the
negotiations themselves, and to assist with drafting the contract. A reluctance to leave the
monitoring of the contract to external advisers was observed. Reluctance to accept external support,
at all stages, due to issues of national sovereignty, confidentiality and trust was also observed.
Need versus expressed demand. A number of interviewees raised the distinction between need and
the actual demand expressed by governments. The question they raised was: how many
governments that have a need for support are actually reaching out for it? And if they are not
reaching out, why not?
As a partial and tentative response to these questions, a number of the interviewees raised the issue
of tension and conflict among ministries. Some ministries may want ownership over particular deals,
and may therefore be reluctant to coordinate and collaborate with other ministries. They may also
be less inclined to reach out for external assistance. Indeed, interviewees commented that on
occasion where external advisors are retained, their ability to provide advice can be subverted. This
is especially the case where the advisors have been retained by a different ministry and there is the
perception that that ministry is trying to control the process.
Alternatively the ministry that wishes to seek assistance may not have the authority or budget to
engage support. In many cases, the authority within government or of a state resources company to
manage the negotiations and to approve final terms is unclear. The range of issues that need to be
addressed in the negotiations is broad (including, for example, taxes, customs duties on imported
equipment, immigration clearance for foreign personnel, relocation of local residents,
environmental issues). These often require coordination by “the lead ministry,” which is often
difficult to achieve and can be significantly complicated by bureaucratic and political rivalries.
Sometimes a particular ministry already has its “trusted advisors” and prefers to keep the selection
to these rather than seek new external assistance. Some countries have had long-term relationships
with individual advisors, institutions or law firms. They may limit the selection of advisors to these
pre-existing relationships or to advisors recommended through these relationships.
Other possible reasons include limited knowledge of what assistance is available (many providers of
subsidized or non-fee based assistance have limited resources and as a result are reluctant to market
their services broadly), or some countries may have had negative experiences with donor assistance
in terms of delays, quality, etc., making them reluctant to call on outside help.
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Finally, in cases of weak governance and corruption, government officials prefer to maintain full
control over the process to ensure maximum discretionary authority in the decision-making process
rather than to call on external advisors who might limit opportunities for pay-offs. This would also
suggest that, if they do employ advisors, corrupt government officials would prefer partial targeted
assistance rather than support over the entire process, which would make pay-offs more difficult.
The consideration of whether governments are willing to seek external advice raises a number of
important questions. What makes those countries that have obtained good assistance different from
others? What have they developed in the way of skills internally? How did they get their external
advisors (and funding to pay for them)? Some have noted that successful deployment of external
advice is often linked to cases where the government pays directly.

G. Key issues for discussion
•

For what purpose is expertise and support needed (e.g. to understand and negotiate
investor-state contracts, contractor/supplier contracts, to improve power imbalances, to
assess and support reforms to laws and regulations, etc.)?

•

What type of support is needed (e.g. technical assistance, training, access to resources,
other) and for which activities?

•

What expertise is needed (e.g. legal, fiscal, geological, environmental, etc.)?

•

What are the barriers to developing country governments demanding advice? What are
the barriers to advice being delivered effectively?

•

Is there a distinction between need and demand and if so, how can it be addressed?

•

Which parts of government are more willing to seek advice and at what stages? Are
there patterns that we can observe?

•

Should there be attempts to provide assistance to governments that do not reach out
for it? If so, how?

•

Are governments willing to pay for support and at what rates? When governments pay
for support, does it lead to better outcomes?
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II. EXISTING SUPPORT AVAILABLE
This section reviews sources of advice and support currently available to developing countries. The
descriptions of the initiatives contained in this Section II and in Annex 2 are based on the research
carried out and are provided for the purpose of stimulating discussion at the July workshop, at which
corrections and comments are welcome where necessary.

A. Overview
Governments can and do procure paid advisory or legal services to assist them in their negotiations
with private parties. In addition, a large number of organizations provide some level of free or
subsidized support to governments for negotiation of long-term investment contracts. This report
provides an inventory, to the extent possible, of these organizations. Table 2 and the subsequent
text provide details about ten prominent initiatives for investment contract negotiations;11 Annex 2
lists other bodies active in this area.
A review of the support available to developing country governments shows that it ranges from
assistance available in the investment environment and pre-negotiation phases (research, policy
formulation, legislative and regulatory reform, preparation of bidding documents and term sheets,
and evaluation of bidding proposals); to the contract negotiation phase itself. Capacity building is
also provided in these phases, though predominantly through short-term training courses. Very few,
if any, organizations provide support in the contract implementation phase of projects.
Where assistance is available, it may in fact be very limited. An important limitation of available
assistance, for example, is that it is often not available at the negotiating table. While some
initiatives do provide direct support for negotiations, often at no cost to the governments, these
initiatives are limited in their funding. A number of donors, who provide funding to allow
governments to retain advisors, will not provide funding for direct negotiations.
There appears to be a relatively large number of organizations providing short-term training courses
to governments on areas related to long-term investment contracts. In addition, there are a number
of sources of non-fee paying or subsidized legal advice, either through bilateral arrangements with
private law firms or through facilities set up to coordinate the provision of legal advice. While the
government may not be paying fees for the advice, an external entity may be paying the fee (as the
advice itself is not provided pro bono by all of these facilities).
Expertise in financial and economic analysis is available, but less prevalent than legal assistance.
Sector-specific and technical expertise appears to be the most difficult to find. In particular, a key
concern for investment banks or industry experts may be the potential for conflicts-of-interest which
would preclude future work, which may dissuade firms or individuals from providing support to
developing country governments. Moreover, even when conflicts-of-interest are not an issue, the
advice may be limited by the lack of demand or the availability of funding, as discussed above.
In addition to the organizations listed in table 2 below and Annex 2, a number of individuals (often
academics and lawyers), retained as consultants, assist governments with tasks on an ad hoc basis
(for example, drafting laws and regulations, preparing for negotiations, advising in negotiations).
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This report does not list these individuals. A number of academics, academic centers and law firms
also provide bilateral support to governments on an ad hoc basis, either on a paid basis, or
externally subsidized and therefore free for the government. Such support is often through preexisting relationships between the individual, center or firm and the particular government. These
individual sources of support are not comprehensively identified in this report.
Finally, some governments of middle income and high income developing countries may go to the
market to obtain support from private firms in a manner similar to industrialized countries. It
appears that this is increasingly the case in South Asia and the Middle East.
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Table 2: Prominent Initiatives for Negotiation Support
Type

Classificatio
n

Countries

Type of
Investment

Fee or NonFee Based?

Number of
projects

Timeframe

In country
/remote

Languages

Based

African Legal
Support
Facility (ALSF)

Prenegotiation,
Negotiation,
Capacitybuilding
(limited)

Legal

Exclusively
African
countries.
ALSF is a public
institution
hosted by the
AfDB, and its
members are
the countries
in AfDB.

All types, but
mostly related
to project
finance
(natural
resources,
extractives,
agriculture,
transport,
PPPs, debt
management)

ALSF finances
the fees of
lawyers (either
by grant or by
loan);
exploring
alternative fee
arrangements
(e.g. investor
to pay legal
fees into an
escrow
account)

Projecting 1012 contracts in
2012, 7 in
2011, 3 in 2010
(assisting 10
countries)

Short term
as well as
long term (1
to 1.5 years)

Generally
remote, but ALSF
encourages face
to face contact.
Local attorneys
are face to face

Depends on
need – lawyers
with required
language skills
are engaged

Abidjan, Cote
d’Ivoire
(Temporarily
relocated to
Tunis, Tunisia)

African Center
for Economic
Transformatio
n (ACET)

Capacity
building,
policy advice

Primarily
policy, some
legal

African
countries

Extractive
resources
(through the
Extractive
Resource
Services
program)

ACET is funded
by donors;
Non-fee based

Limited
number of
workshops

Short term
(workshops)

Workshops may
be held in
country, but a
regional
approach is
taken.

English

Ghana

IMF

Capacity
building,
technical
assistance

Financial

Worldwide

Dedicated fund
for natural
resources
investments

Non-fee based

Short and
long term

In country
through regional
centers

Depends on
need

Washington DC
and regional
centers
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International
Development
Law
Organization
(IDLO)

Capacitybuilding

Legal
(including
sector
lawyers)

Worldwide

Initially treaty
negotiation,
but now
includes
support for
investment
contracts.

IDLO seeks
funding from
donors; Nonfee based

International
Senior
Lawyers
Project (ISLP)

Negotiations;
pre
negotiation
preparation;
legislative and
regulatory
reform;
onsite longterm
capacitybuilding; post
contract
disputes, e.g.,
transfer
pricing;
supplemente
d with
general policy
advice,
workshops,
limited
capacity
development
(some)

Legal
(On occasion,
external
support, such
as a financial
or industry
expert, has
been
arranged,
generally
through
partnerships,
e.g. with
RWI.)

Primarily
African
countries.
Country must
have a
government
moving in a
positive
direction on
transparency
and human
rights issues.
Some funding
is for support
in particular
countries.

Predominantly
extractive
industry
investments
(largely due to
funding), but
not restricted
in principle to
that.

Non-fee based;
out of pocket
costs paid for
by donors or
assisted
governments

Around 10-15
projects per
year, of which
[5-10] are
transactional
projects
(involving
negotiations).

Mostly short
term (e.g.,
training and
workshops)
– due to cost

90 % in country.

Depends on
need

Rome

Short and
long term
(short-term
trainings;
longer-term
onsite
capacitybuilding;
commitment
of many
months or
years for
contract
negotiations
); in some
instances,
e.g., Liberia,
client
relationship
has
continued
over
multiple
projects and
years. ISLP
also sends

Both in-country
and remote.

Depends on
need. Work to
date has
included
English, French,
and Portuguese

New York (with
affiliated offices
in Paris and
London) ;
volunteers drawn
from law firms
principally in
North America,
Europe and South
Africa

15
senior
lawyers to
work onsite
in Liberia
with
ministries
for several
weeks and
multiple
periods and
is prepared
to explore
doing the
same in
other
countries

Norad - Oil for
Development
(OfD)

Capacity
building, prenegotiation
phase
assistance

Legal,
financial

Core - Angola,
Bolivia, Ghana,
Mozambique,
Sudan, South
Sudan, Timor
Leste, and
Uganda. More
limited
relationships Afghanistan,
Bangladesh,
Cuba, Iraq,
Ivory Coast,
Lebanon,
Mauritania,
Nicaragua, The
Palestinian
Territory, São

Oil sector

Non-fee based
(grants)

Depends on
project

In country

Depends on
project

Norway
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Tomé and
Principe and
Tanzania.

Pan African
Lawyers
Union (PALU)

Capacity
building

Legal

African
countries

N/A

PALU training
funded by ALSF

4 workshops
over 1 year

Short term

In-country
support,

English, French

Arusha, Tanzania
(base of
secretariat)

Revenue
Watch
Institute
(RWI)

Structuring of
negotiation
processes,
development
of negotiation
strategy,
support
during
negotiations
(and
renegotiation
), capacity
building,
policy/legislat
ive reform

Legal,
financial
advice,
development

Predominantly
African
countries, also
Mongolia and
Latin America

Extractive
industries

Non-fee based

Varies, but has
been around 3
medium- to
large-scale
projects at any
one time

Short and
long term

In country
support, with
analysis
sometimes done
by remote
experts.

Predominantly
English and
French, also
Spanish

New York,
satellite offices in
Ghana, Peru,
Azerbaijan,
Lebanon,
Indonesia and
London
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UNDP –
Regional
Project for
Capacity
Development
for
Negotiation
and
Regulation of
Investment
Contracts

Capacity
building, prenegotiation,
negotiations,
assistance
with
development
of laws,
regulations
and policy

Legal,
financial,
development

African
countries

Was focused
on, but not
limited to,
natural
resources

Non-fee based

Expanded from
5 to 11 per
year (defined
by number of
countries being
assisted), 5 to
6 additional
countries
wanting to
receive
support

Short and
long term

In-country
support,
coordinated from
Senegal

English, French,
Portuguese
(depends on
project)

UNDP/UNOPS
Regional Service
Center in Senegal

Capacity
building,
prenegotiation
phase

Multidisciplinary
(legal,
financial,
sector
experts,
commercial
commodity
specialists,
environment/
social experts,
infrastructure
specialists)

Worldwide

Extractive
industries

Trust Fund
established by
Bank
members;
Non-fee based
(grants)

In 2009-10 – 3
active, 8
commencing, 7
potential
requests

Depends on
project

In country

Depends on
project

Washington DC

[no longer
operational]
World Bank –
Extractive
Industries
Technical
Advisory
Facility (EITAF)
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B. Prominent initiatives12
1. African Legal Support Facility (ALSF)
ALSF was established in 2009 as an independent institution housed in the African Development Bank
(AfDB), in response to a call by finance ministers both in Africa and internationally to provide
assistance to member countries struggling with vulture fund litigation. It has also provided support
for complex negotiations.
ALSF acts in response to requests for assistance from governments. Because of its affiliation with
the AfDB, ALSF’s point of entry is generally with ministries of finance. However, once engaged, ALSF
seeks involvement by ministries of justice/attorney generals’ offices on the team, as well as sector
specific ministries if the project requires it. On every project, ALSF asks for a “point person” to be
nominated, preferably a lawyer and usually a tenured civil servant, in the relevant government
agency and seeks to require that relevant ministries work together on projects.
ALSF provides funds for governments to retain lawyers, and manages the procurement process
which is essentially similar to AfDB’s procurement guidelines. ALSF maintains a database of
international lawyers with relevant expertise, who bid competitively for projects. ALSF shortlists the
respondents and assists the government with its selection. ALSF requires that local lawyers be
retained by the international lawyers on every project and usefully engaged (i.e. at the table, rather
than acting as “drop boxes”), in order to build capacity of local lawyers. International law firms are
selected on the basis of their skills and fee package offered, as well as their commitment to capacity
building during the project. ALSF’s preferred scenario is that the international lawyers act as support
to the local lawyers. In addition, ALSF requires that international lawyers run training sessions for
government lawyers and local lawyers, when they are in the country.
ALSF usually obtains a discount on market rates (around 20% on hourly fees) and preferably seeks a
fixed fee arrangement. All fee payments are made directly by ALSF to the retained lawyers.
ALSF seeks to monitor the provision of advice, but its ability depends on the particular engagement
and the government’s willingness to disclose information. ALSF requires monthly written reports
from outside counsel, and calls or writes to the government representative monthly.
ALSF has encountered a positive response from governments requesting assistance, which it
attributes in many respects to the fact that governments perceive that they have a stake in the ALSF,
given its relationship to the African Development Bank, and it is therefore not perceived as an
external body providing advice.
ALSF has also run four formal capacity-building sessions for African lawyers, which included complex
commercial transaction in partnership with PALU and PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory
Facility) at the World Bank. ALSF is looking for other ways to provide capacity building facilities for
African government and private lawyers.
ALSF’s staff includes a director, five attorneys, a finance expert, and a three-person administrative
staff. With this staff, ALSF sometimes handles legal projects in-house, typically on shorter,
straightforward, deals, but generally acts as the liaison between the country and the retained
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counsel. ALSF’s profile is higher in countries where it has a field office. ALSF is funded by the AfDB,
bilateral sources and regional development banks.
Limitations: ALSF’s procurement process can lead to delays in making support available. The Facility
currently lacks the mandate to expand – e.g. ALSF has received requests to assist in broader areas
such as law and policy drafting, but has declined. ALSF is trying to develop “best practices” for
projects, but this is difficult, particularly given the variety of sectors and common vs. civil law
systems. Financial, economic, and technical advice are not provided under the ALSF’s mandate. No
requests so far for assistance in deals with China. No policy yet on assisting with renegotiations.
2. African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET)
ACET is an economic policy institute supporting the long-term growth with transformation of African
economies. It conducts research and analysis of economic policies and works for their
implementation through direct advice to governments, advocacy, and knowledge-sharing among
decision makers. ACET helps African countries use their natural resources to drive economic
transformation through policy-oriented research, advice to governments, and capacity-building
programs. To date, ACET has partnered on capacity-building with the Norwegian Agency for

Development Cooperation (NORAD), Petrad, Revenue Watch Institute (RWI), and the World
Bank. With a core staff of twenty from eight African countries based in Accra, ACET brings an
authentic African perspective, augmented by a vast network of leading thinkers throughout the
world.
Limitations: Work is primarily focused on policy-oriented research although some capacity building
is undertaken. ACET has limited staff at present.
3. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The IMF provides technical assistance in its areas of core expertise: macroeconomic policy, tax policy
and revenue administration, expenditure management, monetary policy, the exchange rate system,
financial sector stability, financial sector legislative frameworks, and macroeconomic and financial
statistics. The IMF has increasingly adopted a regional approach to the delivery of technical
assistance and training. It operates eight regional technical assistance centers: in the Pacific; the
Caribbean; East, West, Central, and Southern Africa; the Middle East; and Central America. The IMF
is planning to open a second regional center in West Africa for non-francophone countries in the
region. In addition to the regional centers the IMF provides technical assistance from headquarters
financed internally, through multi-donor topical trust funds, and under schemes with bilateral
donors. The IMF established a topical trust fund for managing natural resource wealth that started
operations in 2011. It aims to help resource-rich countries with their specific needs with respect to
fiscal regimes and related contracts, revenue administration (incl. commitments under the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative), macroeconomic management, transparency arrangements,
public financial management, asset and liability management, and statistics. The objective is to
maximize the development benefits of natural resource wealth. The volume of IMF technical
assistance in extractive industry issues has substantially expanded in recent years.
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Limitations: Assistance is limited to IMF core areas of expertise. The IMF is unwilling to provide
assistance in actual negotiations.
4. International Development Law Organization (IDLO)
IDLO provides both training and technical assistance in relation to investment contracts, i.e. working
with the beneficiary to prepare them for the negotiation. Six years ago, IDLO also began assisting
with institutional reform. Because of IDLO’s policy of strict neutrality, IDLO experts have never
participated in an actual negotiation with the investor. Rather, they seek to enhance the capacity of
beneficiaries to carry out negotiations themselves.
In-house staff or external experts hired by IDLO travel to the country to conduct training workshops
upon a specific request from a government, organization or donor. IDLO generally sends in-house
staff to run workshops, but if it does not have the required expertise it engages an external expert
and designs the workshop or training course with that expert. IDLO maintains a database of external
experts it can draw upon when needed. IDLO interviews proposed experts to ensure that they have
the right experience and language skills; experts must have at least 10 years practical experience and
regional expertise. It then negotiates with the expert an arrangement making sure that the expert
uses IDLO’s Training Methodology, Needs Assessment and Performance Objectives.
IDLO exercises quality control on training events ensuring that IDLO’s training methodology is
rigorously applied by IDLO managers, facilitators and consultants.
The following are examples of relevant support (regarding investment contracts) IDLO has provided:
•

Workshops and training courses for relevant stakeholders within the government in
Mozambique (Ministry for Mineral Resources, Ministry of Environment and Ministry of
Finance) on oil, gas, natural resources, minerals law. IDLO organized training on
negotiation skills and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as well as on the drafting of
bilateral investment treaties and concession agreements.

•

Courses aimed at strengthening the capacity of lawyers negotiating investment
contracts (this course ran for 24 years and was discontinued in 2010 due to lack of donor
funding).

•

Courses to local enterprises and investment lawyers on how to attract FDI and how to
draft investment contracts including PPP infrastructure agreements (courses ran for
many years and were also discontinued in 2010 due to lack of donor funding).

•

Courses on the negotiation of technology transfer agreements.

Limitations: IDLO does not provide technical expert advice on a specific negotiation of a contract
with an investor and is limited in funding for its capacity building programs.
5. International Senior Lawyers Project (ISLP)
ISLP provides training, onsite capacity-building, legislative and regulatory reform assistance and
contract negotiation assistance to governments. In all cases, ISLP operates by providing highly
experienced senior lawyers, on a pro bono basis, to serve as counsel and advisors to governments.
ISLP currently has two paid staff members dedicated exclusively to its economic development
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program. They work with clients and volunteers to develop the terms of reference of an advisory
project and ensure that the project is effectively implemented, secure funding for the program, and
manage the logistical and administrative aspects of each volunteer assignment. ISLP is currently
seeking to fill a new staff or consultancy position that will focus exclusively on economic
development work in Africa.
Typically, governments or third parties make a request to ISLP when a need is identified.
Governments that approach ISLP are generally those with which there is an established relationship,
or where external contacts (e.g. the IMF, a counterpart in another country) have recommended ISLP.
ISLP maintains a network of global law firms and senior lawyers, and requires that lead lawyers on
projects must be partner level. ISLP connects the government with one or more lawyers selected by
ISLP for their specific expertise in the area of need. If the parties decide to go forward, ISLP signs an
engagement letter along with the volunteer (individual or firm) and the government in question.
ISLP monitors the engagement on an ongoing basis, with both the government and the volunteer
(through ongoing and end-of-activity reports) and provides logistical support to the volunteer for
arranging travel and meetings.
In addition to support for actual negotiations or contract disputes, ISLP provides training and
capacity development support. Examples include:
•

High-level capacity building: practical workshops of 3.5 to 5 days duration, in Liberia,
Tanzania and Mozambique, on topics including “an overview of international practices in
negotiating and contracting,” “drafting investment contracts,” “fiscal and financial
provisions,” “best practices for administration and management of mining contracts,”
“how to manage uranium mining contracts,” and “legislative drafting.”

•

Some work on building capacity to monitor extractive-industry investment projects on
an ongoing basis, including in the area of verifying the accuracy of tax receipts.

•

Assistance with the drafting of rules, regulations, and codes related to extractive sectors
(in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mozambique).

•

Ongoing assistance and advice to the Ministry of Finance in Liberia regarding the
development of transfer pricing regulations and their application in particular matters
and general international tax matters including treaties and information exchanges.

Limitations: Although ISLP volunteers have spent significant periods in certain client countries and
have ongoing and continuing relationships with ministries, it does not have any permanent presence
in any recipient country. This deficiency may be addressed in the next several months, when ISLP
retains a full-time staff or consultant to focus exclusively on its economic development work in
Africa. To date ISLP has been able to identify sufficient high quality volunteers to service the projects
it accepts, but the number of projects it can evaluate and take on is limited by staff and funding for
out-of-pocket and administrative expenses. ISLP limits this aspect of its programs to very low
income countries, e.g., Liberia, Sierra Leone and Malawi. ISLP does not take on projects where
governments can reasonably and timely secure paid counsel. Subject to funding, ISLP could envisage
expanding its support to other regions and sectors, although availability of qualified lawyers willing
to do the work on a volunteer basis could become a constraint. ISLP is active in other sectors with
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civil society and governments on economic development issues, human rights, and rule of law; in
some cases these other activities may raise conflicts.
6. Norad - Oil for Development (OfD)
Oil for Development was launched in 2005 in order to focus Norway’s petroleum-related assistance
on work that helps to improve revenue and environmental management in the oil sectors of
resource-dependent developing countries. OfD describes their assistance as “demand driven.”
Requests for assistance, as well as funding to the OfD country programs, are usually channeled
through the embassies.
Oil for Development has arranged workshops preparing cooperating countries for negotiation with
oil companies with regard to block allocations. However, OfD’s assistance stops just before the
negotiating table. For political reasons, they decline to take active part in negotiations. OfD also
collaborates with the World Bank Group on the Extractive Industries – Technical Advisory Facility (EI
-TAF) (which is described below).
Limitations: OfD is able only to provide support in the oil and gas sector, and does not provide direct
assistance for actual negotiations. Experience on the ground has shown limited coordination in
collaborating with other bodies providing assistance in the oil and gas sector, and a propensity to
apply the Norwegian model over alternatives.
7. Pan African Lawyers Union (PALU)
PALU acts as an overarching association for regional and national lawyers’ associations in Africa.
PALU’s mission statement includes legal capacity building, regional integration, and the bolstering of
development initiatives geared toward socio-economic development and the rule of law. PALU’s
work is complemented by its relationships with the African Union and the African Development
Bank.
In 2010, AfDB’s African Legal Support Facility (ALSF) approved a $900,000 grant to PALU. This
partnership aims to increase the capacity of African lawyers to better engage in complex
international commercial transactions and litigation, bringing together the private legal bar and
governments (through an intergovernmental organization). The joint capacity building project will
train over 150 lawyers from across Africa. Regional training seminars have been held for the
Eastern, Southern, Northern and Western African regions in Kigali (February 2011), Cape Town (May
2011), Tunis (January 2012) and Yaoundé (March 2012).
The broad objectives of the project are: to take stock of the “state of play” in complex international
commercial negotiations and dispute resolution across Africa; build a database of lawyers
knowledgeable, skilled and experienced in complex international commercial negotiations and
dispute resolution in Africa; facilitate increased and improved financing of infrastructure projects;
sharpen international arbitration skills; develop the capacity of African lawyers to tackle vulture
funds and better manage public debt; promote the activities of the African Legal Support Facility;
and market PALU and motivate lawyers to join as fee-paying members.
Limitations: Workshops are short term so capacity building is not sustained. The initiative is not
targeted to governments and does not provide direct assistance for negotiations.
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8. Revenue Watch Institute (RWI)
RWI is primarily involved in providing assistance to governments in their review of existing extractive
industry contracts, planning for and assisting in the renegotiation of those contracts, and assessing
the renegotiation process. Infrequently, RWI has assisted with new investment contracts (including
pre-negotiation preparation and negotiation itself). RWI’s core expertise is in providing a
development perspective, as well as advice on fiscal policy, economic modeling and analysis and
good governance. RWI advises oil- and mineral-rich governments on legislative and policy reform,
and seeks to help governments link contract negotiations to these broader sectoral policy reforms.
RWI’s team includes lawyers, economists and governance specialists.
In their contributions to negotiation processes, RWI experts typically serve as members of a team of
advisors, frequently involving sector experts (for example, in diamonds or in iron ore)and other
lawyers from ISLP or retained by governments by other means. RWI has worked closely with UNDP
in Sierra Leone and has had discussions about collaboration with lawyers arranged through the
World Bank EI-TAF or through ALSF. RWI has also worked closely with OfD and ACET in Sierra Leone
and Liberia, providing assistance on the legal framework for petroleum and organizing capacitybuilding workshops covering negotiation strategy, among other subjects. On some occasions, RWI
assists the government to assemble its team for a particular project and on others RWI has been
approached by another organization to join an established team.
Maintaining regional offices in Ghana, Peru, Azerbaijan, Lebanon and Indonesia as well as staff on
the ground in other countries in which RWI is active, assists in delivery of support. For example,
there is a readily available point of contact for government counterparts, communication is easier
and there is the ability to respond quickly to new demands. It is felt that this builds more trust into
the relationship.
Support is generally initiated by request from contacts in government in countries where RWI has a
presence or as a result of RWI’s profile in these issues. Alternatively, contact has been made
through donors or staff on the ground.
Beyond its support to governments, RWI provides extensive capacity building support to civil society
groups, parliaments and other oversight actors throughout the world, including on the analysis and
monitoring of extractive-industry contracts.
Limitations: RWI does not, on its own, enter into traditional attorney-client relationships with
government partners for negotiations; instead, it typically works as part of a team with privatesector lawyers supporting the government, or provides over-arching advice to governments on
contract strategy. RWI’s ability to support negotiations in multiple countries is constrained as a
function of available financial resources.
9. UNDP – Regional Project for Capacity Development for Negotiation and Regulation of
Investment Contracts
The UNDP Regional Project for Capacity Development is no longer operational. The initiative
provided support in a number of areas, with a mission to strengthen governance and transparency
related to large-scale investment contracts, and a core focus on capacity building.
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The Project provided and coordinated external expert support to African government officials in a
number of disciplines, including financial, technical, industry specific, investment bankers and
lawyers. The Project benefited from active guidance from recognized academic experts and
partnered with ISLP, RWI and Advocates for International Development. Although external experts
were engaged to provide technical assistance, the Project staff also provided technical assistance
and actively managed the high level government relationships necessary for successful Project
implementation. The Project was managed through the regional UNDP/UNOPS offices in Dakar,
Senegal. In addition to leading international lawyers and other experts, project assistance to
countries was also carried out with support from African lawyers in the region. Its key focus was the
following:
•

Assistance with development and reform of policies, laws and regulations

•

Assistance with capacity building in evaluation of a country’s assets, setting up bids,
understanding necessary documentation required to qualify bidders, evaluating bids

•

Training on drafting laws and regulation, and negotiations, including substantive issues
largely related to the negotiation of large-scale mineral, oil and gas agreements

•

Briefing and preparing for negotiations

•

Assistance in negotiations

Key strengths of this Project were its presence on the ground through the UNDP regional offices,
balanced technical competence of its staff, and the staff’s ability to function at the highest levels in
both English and French. These attributes allowed Project staff to interact face to face and manage
issues directly with high-level government officials, other stakeholders in-country and recipients of
support. This enabled the Project to develop relationships with government and relevant
stakeholders, which strengthened the ability to deliver support by being perceived as trusted
advisors. As a result, within 12 months of being fully staffed, the Project grew from 5 Project
beneficiary countries to 11 Project beneficiary countries at the specific and high-level request of the
relevant African States.
Limitations: Hosting an initiative like this within a multilateral institution has limitations, for
example, perceived political risks to the organization and shifting organizational priorities on
“special” projects with leadership changes. Additionally, the bureaucratic structure, rules and
regulations of a multilateral institution are not optimal for a Project designed to provide significant
technical expertise from the private sector and support negotiations with the private sector. The
Project was ultimately closed because of funding limitations and cuts.
10. World Bank – Extractive Industries Technical Advisory Facility (EI-TAF)
The EI-TAF is a multi-donor trust fund managed by the Oil, Gas and Mining Policy and Operations
Division of the World Bank. The EI-TAF aims to facilitate rapid response advisory services to
developing country governments for capacity building and to prepare governments for extractive
industry projects, including contract negotiations and associated policy reforms and frameworks.
Services are demand-driven and there has recently been a trend towards requests for assistance in
relation to evaluations of the interface between mining and infrastructure proposals.
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The EI-TAF provides funds to governments – generally an award of around $500,000 – and
government carries out the procurement to assemble the required team of experts. The World Bank
maintains a list of consultants with particular expertise. The procurement process is monitored by
the World Bank under its procurement rules, including the provision of a report detailing the reasons
for selection of each expert. Where the country does not have the capacity to undertake the
procurement process, the World Bank will carry it out on the country’s behalf. Generally a multidisciplinary team of 5-7 experts is assembled, which includes legal, financial, sector, commodity,
environmental and social expertise. Increasingly, there is also a physical infrastructure specialist
(e.g. roads, rail, and port as relevant). Ministries are required to nominate counterpart specialists,
who will work with the experts in order to develop capacity.
Experts are engaged at market rates and the funding generally lasts around 8-10 months. The
general turn-around time from request to engagement is around 2-3 months.
According to its 2010 Progress Report, EI-TAF is able to respond to country needs for advisory
assistance on a much faster basis than traditional World Bank lending and technical assistance
instruments. EI-TAF works on a first-come / first-served basis and the projects are reviewed and
decided in a single meeting.
A meeting is convened with donors to the EI-TAF trust twice a year to go through the countries to
which assistance has been provided. The World Bank is currently working on developing new
measures for success of projects.
Limitations: Governments have commented that provision of assistance on occasion is not fast
enough. Procurement and financial management issues were slow when the grants were recipientexecuted (managed by the government). However, since April 2012 the donors and EI-TAF program
management have switched to largely World Bank-executed implementation arrangements.
Assistance is not provided for negotiations themselves. The position of EI-TAF is that governments
themselves should be driving the negotiations, although there may also be concerns which stem
from key World Bank shareholders or trust fund donors.
In addition to these ten key initiatives, an inventory of other mechanisms of support is provided in
Annex 2. This list is not intended to be exhaustive and comments are invited during the workshop.

C. Key issues for discussion
•

Among the existing initiatives, which are the ones that stand out as particularly
effective, and why? What are the main limitations?

•

Is there any particular stage in the contracting process where these initiatives need
focus in particular (pre-negotiations, negotiations, monitoring etc…)?

•

Where is there overlap among existing initiatives?

•

What lessons can be learned from existing initiatives in relation to dealing with issues of
impartiality, conflict of interest and trust?

•

Based on the review of existing initiatives is it possible to say what an appropriate type
of specialist support should look like? Is it possible to develop a set of criteria for
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‘appropriate / effective’ support? What about the role of advisors and their position on
certain issues?
•

What are examples of countries that have received effective support? How do they
manage the process of obtaining external advisors (and funding to pay for them), as well
as using the advice? What it was about the support which made a difference? What
types of skills were developed internally?
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III WHAT IS MISSING
This section of the report reviews the gaps that have been identified in the current range of sources
of assistance for negotiation support.
1. Expertise other than legal
The review in the previous section shows that there are organizations providing legal support in all
phases of negotiations, albeit the support is limited for specific negotiations (see below) and for
monitoring and implementation. In addition, there are a number of programs that provide capacity
building on legal issues.
Non-legal experts are less readily available – for example,
financial/economic experts, financial modelers, sector experts, investment bankers for financial
structuring, and development specialists.
The weakest area in terms of availability of support relates to assistance targeted to industryspecific technical expertise. A knowledge gap usually exists between the government and the
investor (e.g. geological data and its interpretation, global sector trends, technology developments,
sustainable development challenges, environmental management). Governments often do not
possess industry-specific commercial skills or access to critical information (global commodity
market trends, commodity pricing trends and systems, consumer trends). The presence of an
industry specialist on the team can help build the government’s credibility and confidence when
dealing with the company’s negotiating team.
A number of respondents commented that it can be a challenge, in particular, to find strong industry
experts, due to conflict-of-interest issues. Industry experts often work for investors and may
therefore display reluctance to work for governments. It was also noted by several respondents that
governments can show a reluctance to bring in external experts associated with industry for fear of
breaches of confidentiality. Governments may also not have the ability to pay the fees charged by
these experts or may not even be aware of the need for this expertise.
In addition, governments may need assistance in the management aspects relating to assembling a
negotiating team to prepare for and carry out a negotiation, including but not limited to identifying
experts that are required in addition to lawyers. An external advisor can also be helpful in managing
internal government negotiations.
2. Limitations of existing legal assistance
a)

Limitations of non-fee paying legal assistance

A number of initiatives exist to provide non-fee based or subsidized legal advice to governments.
However, these initiatives are often limited in their funding and therefore the amount of support
they are able to provide. Moreover, as mentioned previously, a number of donors that provide
funding to allow governments to retain advisors will not provide that funding for direct
negotiations.
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b)

Limitations of specialty, timeframe and scope of existing legal assistance

It was noted that legal experts retained may not have specialist experience in the relevant sector
(e.g. extractive industries), or in working with and serving the needs of government. For example,
transactional lawyers may tend to focus on “getting the deal done,” which may not include a long
term view of the terms of the deal for the country or revenue management issues. Moreover, the
assistance may be limited in timeframe or scope according to the resources and mandate of the
external initiative rather than by the needs of the government. Strong monitoring standards should
be implemented to ensure that the advice provided is real, tangible and practical. It is preferable for
lawyers to be involved over a long term, in order to develop relationships with government clients.
c)

Limitations of experience and relationships with the government

Without experience working with governments, the experts may not have the incentive (or the
experience) to create ownership within the broader confines of government, for example, working
slowly in order to obtain buy-in from competing government groups for the negotiation strategy.
This may therefore ultimately not translate into good outcomes for the country. Indeed, one
respondent commented that key success factors for the provision of support are: (a) providers of
support should have the confidence and trust of governments; (b) there has to be buy-in and
political will at the top; (c) the approach must be conciliatory rather than antagonistic (if advisors
create a rift between governments and investors, the resulting acrimony will be prejudicial); (d) the
support must enable governments to articulate their own visions; and (e) the support must provide
the government with the capacity to achieve the vision and promote governance in addition to
carrying out a short term transaction. Experience working with governments, as well as long term
involvement as discussed below, is important in order to understand and be able to address these
issues.
d)

Limitations imposed by government procurement processes and funding

A government’s ability to engage effective legal advice may be affected by its procurement
processes. These processes may require that legal services are engaged by tender, with the contract
generally being awarded to the lowest bid. In some cases, this may mean that the government does
not receive the highest quality advice. For example, in order to “get a foot in the door,” firms may
bid low prices and then provide more junior (and less experienced) lawyers to work on the project.
In some cases, the fee arrangement may also be subsequently renegotiated (and increased) over the
course of the engagement, if the fees were unrealistic at the outset.
On other occasions, governments may wish to retain experienced counsel, but are impeded by lack
of available funding sources, meaning that it may be impossible, or a long process, to engage their
desired counsel.
3. Timing of support
Governments often do not seek help with negotiations at an early stage, putting them at a
disadvantage in the negotiations from the outset. On occasion, negotiations have already
commenced (sometimes even after the term sheet has been agreed) before external assistance is
sought. This may mean, for example, that certain options have not been considered, leading to a
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less advantageous contract. Late requests for assistance might be due to political sensitivities, to
inexperience, to lack of funding and to the desire to maintain control over the negotiation.
Respondents underlined that for the best negotiating outcomes it was important for the
government to put together the negotiating team, including both officials and external advisors, at
the very start of the process rather than bring in experts part way through, and to the extent
possible, to maintain the same negotiating team throughout the negotiation. Providing resources,
tools and assistance even before the negotiating process starts—for instance, with drafting model
contracts, policy reviews and formation, and industry research—can also be instrumental in shaping
successful negotiations.
4. Support following conclusion of a contract – implementation phase
There is a significant gap in the availability of support to governments following the conclusion of a
contract. The governments’ tasks here are to ensure contract compliance (both in terms of financial
and fiscal elements, and for environmental and social performance), and to plan for end-of-life
activities such as environmental cleanup, labor creation for affected communities, etc.
Other than limited capacity-building workshops, there does not appear to be support dedicated to
the implementation, enforcement and monitoring of the contracts or to strengthening
governments’ capacity to do so.
5. Long-term assistance
Many of the initiatives provide assistance for particular projects and for limited phases of those
projects only. The assistance is not provided over the long term, to build up a particular ministry,
agency or national resource company. Respondents commented that an external advisor
“parachuting” in and out does not serve the capacity building needs of governments. Rather, it is
important to become a “trusted advisor” in order to provide capacity building, and this needs to be
built up over a period of time. Short-term training sessions are also of limited benefit.
While model contracts may be available, host-country negotiators may not understand where they
can deviate from the terms, or the company may try to refuse to negotiate from the model. In
addition, model contracts need to be used carefully, understanding that each project should be
independently evaluated and may require different terms. In addition, without significant
experience gained through practice in negotiations, in the face of company’s negotiating teams and
political pressure, it can be difficult to maintain a strong position or to know which way to go on
particular issues. This sort of experience cannot be taught in short term training sessions.
An example was provided of long term assistance provided to the Indonesian government by
advisors from Harvard University who were involved in Indonesia for about 20 years. Expatriate
advisors, experts in economics, planning and law, were based in two critical ministries with longterm commitments (of around 2 years or longer). Over that time, the resident advisors brought in
short-term experts from abroad as needed, but the residents themselves remained on the ground to
help officials implement the advice, or to help modify it as problems arose.
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One respondent commented that it is important for governments to determine what kind of
expertise to develop internally, which would be addressed by long term capacity building, and what
should be outsourced.
6. Knowledge management and knowledge sharing
There is generally a lack of availability of documentation. For example, there are few documents
describing “best practices” in terms of policy frameworks, legal and fiscal terms, contract provisions,
etc.., as applicable to common law and civil law countries. In addition, accessing past or existing
contracts as precedents, models or for comparison can be difficult. There is limited knowledge
sharing between countries and regions of concluded contracts and related documents and there can
also be a lack of co-ordination between different teams (e.g., across different sectors) within one
country. Countries also lack contract management systems to enable monitoring and enforcement
of contractual terms over the long term of the project. In contrast, in the private sector, companies
or firms are able to access many other industry contracts, either through the firm’s own precedent
system or through specialized subscription databases. Here, better knowledge sharing mechanisms
and resources would be useful for building in-country knowledge and precedents.
Ideally governments would use model contracts and associated standard documentation in the key
sectors: mining, oil and gas, forestry, toll roads, water and sanitation plants, independent power
plants, etc., with clear guidance on the fact that they must be adapted to the context of the
particular deal. However, these specialized resources are not readily available.
Finally, there is limited opportunity for local experts to get exposure to similar transformative,
large-scale transactions. Unlike experts of industrialized countries who have more international
flexibility to develop their practice on a wider geographical scope, local experts have limited
occasions to develop experience in negotiations in house.
The lack of institutional knowledge is exacerbated within governments by high staff turnover in
government agencies, which means that the skills and ability to build institutional knowledge are
lost. More formalized knowledge-sharing mechanisms could be useful in this respect.
7. Sector focus of available support
Most of the existing initiatives provide support for negotiations of oil, mining and gas contracts but
now there is an emerging focus on other major investment contracts, such as for land or
infrastructure projects.
One respondent commented that it would be helpful to understand the evolving needs of
government in new areas where support is required. For example, in South Asia and the Middle East
where governments and local firms have developed capacity for negotiations of natural resource
contracts, they are now increasingly negotiating agreements relating to pipelines and transportation
where their knowledge is less extensive. Assistance in building up capacity, and the ability to share
knowledge between countries and develop “best practices” in those areas is needed.
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A. Key issues for discussion
•

Does the above review accurately represent the gaps between the identified needs of
governments and the available support?

•

Specifically, where are there gaps in terms of type of expertise? Geographic focus? Type
of contract? Stage in the contracting process? Direct participation in the negotiating
process?
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IV

HOW TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE SUPPORT

This paper posits that in order to achieve more robust and balanced contracts governing major
investments, it would be useful for developing country governments to be able to call on world class
legal, technical and financial skills that they do not possess, as well as to increase their own capacity
in those fields (Section I). In the prior review of existing support, it should be noted that while a large
number of support initiatives exist (Section II), there remain significant gaps (Section III). This section
poses a number of key questions as to whether and how existing sources of support could usefully
be complemented to ensure comprehensive support. It is designed to foster discussion concerning
various possible options.

A. Objectives
Clear objectives must be set in the context of criteria to be considered in evaluating the sufficiency
of existing mechanisms and/or the need for any new mechanisms, as well as to determine the
appropriate mechanism going forwards (if any). As has been discussed in the sections above, some
of the important criteria to consider include (but are not limited to) the following.
• Advice is needed in integrated specializations, including but not limited to, legal support,
financial and business expertise, geological and technical expertise, environmental
expertise, and other areas of knowledge, outlined in section I and Annex 1 of this report.
• Advice and assistance is needed at all stages of the contracting process, from the precontracting phases (of designing model contracts and drafting legislation) through
implementation, as outlined in detail in section I and Annex 1. Different skills would be
required in each of these phases.
• Technical support needs to be high quality, based on extensive field experience.
• Relationships with the government are important, and long-term, resident relationships can
be helpful in that respect.
• Tools and resources that provide increased access to information (including contracts, other
legal frameworks, etc…) can help to level the field in terms of access to precedents and
information.
• Capacity building needs to be structured, long term and often resident where possible.
• Funding mechanisms are important to consider, as they may impact aspects of the advice,
such as the buy-in of the government and sufficiency of resources for the provision of
assistance, among other things.

B. Consideration of mechanisms to provide support
There are a number of options that could be considered as mechanisms to address the gaps. For
instance, one or a combination of the following options may be explored.
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• Working with some of the existing initiatives to expand their support to sectors and regions
currently not covered. This may include expanding technical and financial support as well as
making available precedent documents, knowledge management systems and other tools
and resources.
• Creating a mechanism to coordinate existing sources of support, drawing on the strengths of
each.
• Creating a new initiative, either targeted at the gaps identified or comprehensive in design.
A new initiative could deliver support in a number of ways, for example, it may be directed
at providing the tools, resources and/or innovative approaches described below, it may
address the gaps in existing support, coordinate existing support, it could provide
comprehensive support, or a combination of these options.
• Designing improved tools and resources (as discussed in part C below), as well as new
creative ways to support governments (e.g., through the use of the media and social
networking to enable widespread sharing and comparison of information and pricing
information, contract norms and outcomes, problem-solving frameworks13 to assist
governments with developing plans and negotiaion strategy). These could be delivered
through any mechanism which is taken forward.
It could be argued that support to the government at every phase of an investment project – from
the pre-negotiation phase, to the negotiation phase and contract implementation phase – by one
organization would be the ideal option, because of the overall consistency and seamlessness that
this would present in terms of advice. The question must however be asked whether this approach is
indeed feasible or practical given the scale that such support would require and given the number of
initiatives already successfully providing certain types of support. In this regard, a new initiative may
better be targeted at coordinating this existing support and filling any gaps, in both resources and
tools available.
It should be determined whether it is indeed feasible or desirable to combine all required skills
within one initiative, and if it is what the pros and cons are of such an approach. (Were a new
initiative to be considered, Annex 3 provides some options for its institutional structure.)
Finally, if it is not necessary or possible for support to be provided effectively at all stages of the
process and for all relevant skills within one initiative, consideration must be given to where the
addition of more limited support should be concentrated, or which areas or activities should initially
be given priority.

C. The need for tools, resources and long-term capacity building
A first (or ongoing) step that may be taken, whichever of the options is pursued, is to create useful
tools and resources to be made available to developing country governments to expand on the few
tools already available (for example, the Extractive Industries Source Book, the Model Mineral
Development Agreement, and the Natural Resource Charter, all listed in Annex 2). Tools and
resources could be provided through whichever type mechanism is adopted (e.g., through a
coordinating mechanism or a new initiative).
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These may include databases of contracts (perhaps coordinated with the World Bank Institute
initiative listed in Annex 2) together with appropriate guidance as to the need to ensure that each
contract must be specific to the deal at hand, websites providing comparisons of countries’ legal and
fiscal regimes and infrastructure arrangements, fiscal and economic analysis tools (such as that being
developed by SNR Denton and ACT Financial Consulting, listed in Annex 2), geological databases and
expert databases. A toolkit that was commissioned by the Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation
(based in Canada) as a resource for First Nation, Inuit and Métis communities in Canada considering
impact and benefit agreements (such as those with mining companies) may serve as a useful
example. 14 While the toolkit focuses on the mining industry, many of the issues and processes
addressed in the toolkit are relevant in other sectors and contexts. The toolkit is being rolled out
with training sessions in Aboriginal communities and is being taken up by Aboriginal communities as
well as their advisers. Many of the issues faced by Aboriginal communities in negotiations of impact
and benefit agreements with investors parallel those faced by developing country governments.

D. Key issues for discussion
•

How can existing initiatives be supported or expanded? Is a new initiative needed?

•

Which of these gaps should this process focus on and at which stage in the contracting
process (legislative drafting, pre-negotiations, negotiations, monitoring etc…)?

•

Should this process cover all kinds of complex commercial contracts (e.g. investment and
other commercial contracts)? Or which types of contracts should be prioritized?

•

Is it feasible to combine all the types of legal/ economic/geological/industry assistance
in one mechanism/initiative?

•

Should this process have a global focus or is a regional focus more feasible?

•

What types of tools, activities or resources could usefully be developed and made
available to assist governments in negotiations? Are there other creative/innovative
possibilities for providing support?

•

Exploratory discussion: what types of institutional arrangements might help ensure
comprehensive support? Could a few ideas be piloted to help inform the design of any
larger external mechanisms?
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Annex I: Analysis of needs to support developing countries in their contract negotiations
(Based on outcomes of the Berlin 2011 workshop, desk research, and interviews with international experts and government officials)
Typical Activity

Goals with Respect to the Activity

Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity

SETTING THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT
Formulate government policies
and strategies

 Sound policies providing
guidance/information relevant for the
negotiation of a complex contract. (e.g.,
FDI and fiscal policies, national
development strategy, sector strategies).
 Unambiguous comprehensive legislation
and regulations.

Reform legislative/
regulatory
framework

1

 Model contracts (according to best
practices) to minimize discretion in the
contract negotiating process, with
guidance as to which provisions may be
altered in the course of negotiation.

2011 Action Plan of the “Africa Mining Vision”1: There is need to build capacity and
enhance skills of government officials in formulating policies, laws and regulations.
International Expert: Assistance is needed for the development of a national vision.
This is crucial for a successful outcome of the negotiations in providing direction and
guiding principles to the negotiation team. Capacity development is needed with
respect to policy formulation, statutory and technical issues.
Berlin Workshop 2011 Report: Improved assistance involves building long-term
relationships with governments to develop and improve the broader legal framework.

African Union Commission, African Development Bank, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2011). “Building a sustainable future for Africa’s extractive industry: From vision to
action. Action Plan for implementing the African Mining Vision.” Addis Ababa.
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Typical Activity

Goals with Respect to the Activity

Conduct sectorwide analyses and
strategies

 Good understanding of resource or
infrastructure potential, providing
guidance/information relevant for the
negotiation of a complex contract (e.g., oil
and gas reserve estimates, infrastructure
needs).

Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity

PRE-NEGOTIATION PHASE
Conduct/review
feasibility and
other studies

Conduct/review
environmental/
social impact
assessments

Prepare the
tendering
documents (incl.
draft contract)/
term sheet

 Obtain crucial information that defines
the framework of the contract through
feasibility studies, geological or microeconomic studies etc.
 Obtain crucial information on adverse
impacts of a project through
environmental, social and safety impact
assessments to be considered in the
contract.
 Prevention, mitigation or rehabilitation of
potentially adverse impacts on
environment, human health and social
aspects (e.g. Environmental Management
Plan).
 Well-drafted and comprehensive
tendering documents/term sheet.
Preparation of/input to the draft
contract/term sheet by legal counsel with
sector expertise, sector experts.

Berlin Workshop 2011 Report: Assistance is needed early in the process, e.g., before the
exploration phase (important when the license is bundled to the exploration license) or
before a privatization.
Governmental Official: Support is needed to obtain sound geological information
which is crucial for extractive industries projects. Geological expertise is most needed.
International Expert: Capacity development is needed to bridge the knowledge gap
between the government and the investor: development of industry specific technical
expertise (e.g., geological data, global sector trends, sustainable development
challenges, environmental management) and development of industry specific
commercial skills (e.g., global commodity market trends, global commodity pricing
systems, consumer trends). The parties should go into the negotiation as equal
partners with the same technical information.

Berlin Workshop 2011 Report: Assistance is needed in setting competitive bidding
processes.
Government officials/International experts: Legal Assistance is needed for contract
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Typical Activity

Goals with Respect to the Activity

Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity
formulation (see also the Negotiation Phase).

Manage the
tendering process

Prepare the
financial structure,
as applicable

 Identify the “best” contracting party
through a sound, competitive (if possible
and suitable in the circumstances),
inclusive and transparent tender
process.

 An appropriate and sound financial
structure.

Government Official: In view of the highly complex nature of the activities involved in
the tendering process, outside expertise is needed.

Several government officials/international experts: There is a need for financial analysts
and investment bankers. Some added that those are needed only on a short-term basis
for the specific transaction. One government adviser mentioned that countries in Africa
most needed financial analysts, and capacity-building is required in particular in the
financial area.

NEGOTIATION PHASE

Prepare the
negotiation

 Determination of a national position
taking into account the positions of all
relevant stakeholders. Determination of
areas of higher and lesser priority in
which concessions to the other party can
be made.
 Preparation of all documents & research
of issues in consultation with other
experts, as necessary, to bolster the
Government’s negotiation position.

Berlin Workshop Report/Government Officials/International Experts: Support is needed
to strengthen the negotiation capacity of governments when they negotiate complex
contracts. Improved assistance through “training that is long enough to cover the full
process, including building negotiation skills and not only technical skills.”
International Expert: There is a need for a high level (national) position on the key
issues reached by a government before the negotiation team enters the negotiation
room (so that the team has sufficient directions on which issues it may negotiate).

2

Develop
negotiation

2

 A clear and effective negotiation
strategy

Lessons Learned from the External Assistance provided for the Liberia Renegotiations : A
clear and effective negotiation strategy is needed as it can make a significant difference
to the outcome of the negotiations. Training programs are needed which should

Raja Kaul, Antoine Heuty and Alvina Norman. 2009. Getting a better deal from the Extractive Sector. Concession Negotiation in Liberia 2006-2008. Revenue Watch Institute. Washington.
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Typical Activity

Goals with Respect to the Activity

strategy

Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity
include leadership and teamwork, concession negotiation management and strategy,
negotiator training for complex negotiations.
Research of the World Economic Forum’s Responsible Mineral Development Initiative
interviewing stakeholders of 13 countries in three regions: capacity building needs
3
include preparation of negotiation strategies, negotiation and drafting of contracts.

Assemble (multidisciplinary)
negotiation team

 An effective multi-disciplinary
negotiation team which is composed in a
professionally balanced manner (i.e., all
relevant ministries) and comprises all
relevant disciplines.

Lessons Learned from the External Assistance provided for the Liberia Renegotiations: A
multi-disciplinary negotiation team comprising individuals with different backgrounds,
skills and experience (e.g., with significant mining, environmental, investment banking,
finance, legal, and management experience) is needed in order to have a successful
outcome of renegotiations.
International Expert: Governments need assistance in assembling a negotiating team.
Berlin Report/Several Government Officials and International Experts: Legal, financial
(modeling), geological, environment experts are needed for the negotiation of the
contract.

Governmental official: Capacity building is needed for these disciplines.

3

World Economic Forum. (2011). Research Report. Stakeholders Perceptions and Suggestions. Responsible Mineral Development Initiative 2010. Geneva.
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Typical Activity

Negotiate the
contract/draft and
review contractual
provisions

Goals with Respect to the Activity

 An effective and smooth negotiation
where both parties are on an equal
playing field (with the same information,
expertise and understanding of the
available options).

 A contract which is well-drafted,
responsive to changing circumstances
and fair to both parties.

Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity
Literature: Expert negotiators are needed as a means for a developing country to
successfully and profitably exploit its natural resources for national advancement and at
4
relatively low cost.
Several Government Officials: They need short-term outside experts for the support of
negotiations of bigger transactions.
Lessons Learned from the External Assistance provided for the Liberia Renegotiations:
Support (i.e. legal support complemented by industry-specific, financial and other
support) is needed for the negotiation of the contract: preparing proposals and
counter-proposals on specific provisions; drafting language for resolving conflicts,
modeling financial projections of the impact to changes in government's positions;
helping finding viable compromises to apparent “deadlock” situations, advising on the
implications and ramifications of proposed positions. External advisors should advise
the government negotiators, but not be at the negotiating table themselves.

CONTRACT IMPLEMENTATION PHASE

Monitor/ ensure
contract
compliance

 Contract compliance is monitored/
ensured (e.g., with respect to
operational, fiscal, financial,
environmental and social obligations) and
plan for end-of-life activities
(environmental clean-up, labor creation
for affected communities).

Draft Revisions to the Natural Resource Charter5: The fundamental issue is not so much
the design of environmental and social legislation and regulations, but rather the
capacity of government agencies at national, and importantly, at local levels to
monitor and enforce environmental and social laws and regulations.

 Institutions/mechanisms are built for
contract monitoring (specialized

Government Adviser/Official: Governments prefer to have the monitoring of the
contract done by their own people. Capacity-building is needed to understand the

Several Government Officials: Countries need capacity building of government officials
for the monitoring of the contract.

4

Radon, Jenik (2007). Chapter 4: How to negotiate an Oil Agreement. Columbia University, New York.

5

Draft revisions to the Natural Resource Charter, December 2011: http://www.naturalresources.org
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Typical Activity

Goals with Respect to the Activity
monitoring agencies as a large taxpayer
unit).

Needs of Support with Respect to the Activity
specific field relevant for monitoring the contract implementation (e.g., finances,
exports, internal pricing).
Berlin Workshop Report/Government Adviser: Improved assistance should involve
building long-term relationships with governments to develop and improve
enforcement capacity.
Literature: Capacity-building is needed with respect to the calculation and collection of
6
revenues from projects (e.g., taxes).
State agencies should be equipped with knowledge and training to be able to credibly
monitor contract compliance. The State must ensure that it has the capacity to
effectively review, evaluate and to take appropriate and timely action on environmental
7
and social impact assessments.

6

Bryan Land (2009). Capturing a fair share of fiscal benefits in the extractive industry. Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 1; UNCTAD, Geneva and New York, p. 170

John Ruggie.(2011). Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. General
Assembly Resolution of 25 May 2011. A/HRC/17/31/Add.3. United Nations. New York, paragraph 30, p.12
7
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Annex 2: Other Organizations Providing Support to Developing Countries for Contract Negotiations

8

Adam Smith International (ASI)
Legal, financial, policy, capacity building

ASI is an international advisory firm with an extractive industries practice that provides consulting
services to both international investors and host governments. Key services include political and
risk analysis, assistance with legal, fiscal and legislative reform (including issuance of mineral
rights and the licensing regime associated with exploration and mining) as well as institutional
reform meant to strengthen the capacity of government ministries to better manage the energy
sector. ASI is particularly active in the mining arena. In working with governments, ASI develops
regulations that enable licensing, monitoring and safe and responsible business practices. ASI has
also launched a training course on extractive industries governance.

ABA Rule of Law Initiative
Legal, capacity building

Develops and supports legal education, governance and anti-corruption programs throughout the
world.

Advocates for International Development (A4ID)
Legal

A4ID has three broad areas of assistance – non-fee based legal advice, awareness raising (through
a resource center containing reports and legal guides prepared by legal partners) and an events
and training program (for both legal partners and development partners).
Legal advice is provided to those who qualify as “development partners”, which can include
developing country governments, charities, NGOs, inter-governmental organizations, social
enterprises, bar associations and law societies. The criteria to qualify include that the
development partner must “abide by strong and transparent systems of governance and

8

This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but is an indication of sources of support available. Comments are invited during the workshop on additional sources of support not identified in
Annex 2.
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accountability” and if it is an organization, it cannot make its assistance contingent on religious or
political affiliation. A4ID also maintains a network of legal partners. Development partners
submit a request for legal assistance and A4ID matches them with a legal partner.
Support has been provided in Africa, Asia and Central and South America.
African Mineral Development Center (AMDC)

The AMDC will be established to strategically coordinate the implementation of the African
Mining Vision (AMV). The AMDC will coordinate activities including the provision of technical
support for the implementation of the AMV, identifying gaps and areas of need potential
expertise to address those needs, undertake and coordinate policy research, undertake advocacy
and information dissemination, monitor and evaluate activities relating to the implementation of
the AMV and provide a think tank capacity for the AMV and the activities around it.

Ausaid – Mining for Development program
Capacity building

Launched in October 2011. Provides assistance through scholarships, study programs and
research assistance, in Africa and Asia-Pacific, particularly focused on improving governance.
Also, through this Mining for Development program, the International Mining for Development
Center (IM4DC) was established, which will provide access to education and training, as well as
technical and other advice, including through short courses in Australia and overseas, fellowships
in Australia, mentoring and capacity building of local institutions, publishing guides and tools and
conference and alumni events and support. IM4DC is targeting capacity in three areas governance and regulation, community and environmental sustainability and operational
effectiveness and safety. IM4DC does not have any courses planned at present that offer
coaching on negotiations directly, although as its activities are aimed at building capacity in
mining governance it is intended that will enhance negotiating capacity. Country needs
assessments and scoping studies may well identify need for direct capacity building in
negotiations in certain jurisdictions, although this would be generic rather than aimed at any
particular project.
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Brookings Institution
Policy

Provides substantial research and policy recommendations through its "Africa Growth Initiative",
which focuses on 5 areas - macroeconomic management and the political economy, industrial
policy, modernizing agriculture, managing natural resource exploitation and poverty alleviation
and social protection.

Centre for Energy, Petroleum, and Mineral Law
and Policy (CEPMLP)
Legal expertise, capacity building

CEPMLP is the lead Consultant for the Extractive Industries Source Book project. It is the largest
graduate school in the world for the study of law, policy, economics, and management of the
international petroleum, mining, and energy sectors. CEPMLP provides consultancy services to
government.

CEPIL (Centre for Public Interest Law)
Legal expertise

CEPIL is a Ghana-based non-profit organization providing research and guidance to promote
public interest law, particularly in the area of extractive rights. CEPIL helped implement the IIEDled “Legal tools” training program in Ghana.

Commonwealth Secretariat
Technical Expertise

The Commonwealth Secretariat’s Strategic Plan has two “goals” (peace and democracy and propoor growth and sustainable development), through which it has built programs to assist
Commonwealth countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.
Until around 10 years ago, the Commonwealth Secretariat had an active technical cooperation
program which provided support to governments in relation to negotiations for investment
contracts, particularly related to natural resources. The in-house team was led by a number of
experts in the field, which had the ability to assemble teams with the necessary expertise for
particular transactions (including lawyers, financial experts and industry experts). However, the
technical cooperation program ceased to be funded, the in-house experts who founded the
program ended their terms, and the program has not been maintained.

Extractive Industries Source Book

The EI Source Book is a free online, interactive resource that provides a narrative analysis of the
sector, supplemented by downloads and other web resources, including specially commissioned

44
reports, summaries and briefs. The EI Source Book is principally intended for use by senior
government officials and decision makers and by supporting domestic and international technical
specialists. It focuses on sector policy, legal and regulatory development and administration, fiscal
issues, and their linkages to broader impacts across the economy.
The EI Source Book is a partnership between the World Bank Group, a global consortium of
universities led by the University of Dundee, and non-governmental organizations.
Foundation for International Environmental Law
and Development (FIELD)
Legal expertise

FIELD is a wholly independent organization working with IIED to provide legal services to
disadvantaged countries, communities and campaigners negotiating for fairer international
environmental laws. FIELD’s three principal thematic areas are multilateral environmental
treaties, accountability and good governance, and energy and investment. Work in the energy
and investment theme appears to involve research and policy related publications, to date a
publication on ‘Opening Up Oil and Gas Policy in Kazakhstan’.

International Bar Association (IBA)
Legal expertise, capacity building

The IBA is an international association of lawyers and lawyers' associations whose purpose is to
influence the development of international law reform and positively shape the future of the legal
profession worldwide. IBA’s Oil and Gas Law Committee and Mining Law Committee have been
particularly active in developing frameworks that balance the needs and rights of both host
countries and international investors.
Most significantly, IBA’s Model Mining Development Agreement (MMDA) brings together
“international best practice principles” into a negotiation template for investor-state agreements
in the mining sector in developing countries. The MMDA is intended to be used as a nonprescriptive negotiation tool for mining development agreements where either ‘mature’ mining
codes are not in place or a mining code requires supplementation by private contract.

International Institute for Environment and
Development (IIED)

IIED covers five central research themes: natural resources, climate change, human settlements,
sustainable markets and governance. In partnership with similar organizations throughout Africa,
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Legal

Asia and Latin America IIED projects serve to strengthen capacity and governance mechanisms at
the local, national and global levels. IIED has developed a Legal Tools program which also provides
resources for host countries by developing, testing and implementing replicable capacity-building
tools and methods to help local groups, national civil society and governments make use of
available legal options. Though still in its infancy, Legal Tools has already provided legal literacy
training in Ghana, Mali and Senegal - to inform and empower local communities and civil society,
but which have been conducted further upstream to government officials. These trainings focus
on land rights, decentralization, benefit-sharing opportunities and negotiation skills. IIED also
provides a host of free training manuals and legal tools that instruct governments on how to
structure investment contracts for natural resource projects that maximize the investment’s
contribution to sustainable development.
The Legal Tools program has been delivered together with the following partners:
•

In Ghana, national and local-level trainings have been led by the Centre for Public Interest
Law (CEPIL).

•

In Mali, activities have been led by Le Groupe d’Etude et de Recherche en Sociologie et Droit
Appliqué (GERSDA), an action-research oriented center that brings together legal expertise,
grounded legal empowerment experience, and partnerships with producer organizations.

•

In Mozambique, in-country work has been led by Centro Terra Viva (CTV), a public interest
environmental law organization. CTV’s objectives are to promote participatory
environmental governance rooted in science, justice and law.

•

In Senegal, activities were coordinated by IED Afrique: Innovations Environnement
Développement. IED Afrique works to strengthen the capacity of vulnerable groups,
documenting local practices and information policies.

The Legal Tools program has received funding from the following bodies: Irish Aid (Ireland),
Danida (Denmark), DFID (UK), DGIS (the Netherlands), Norad (Norway), SDC (Switzerland), and
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Sida (Sweden).
International Institute for Sustainable
Development (IISD)
Legal expertise

International Lawyers for Africa (ILFA)
Legal expertise

IISD’s support ranges from in-depth research on investment law and investment dispute
settlement to capacity building programs and forums meant to assist developing countries in
forging sound investment contracts and treaties. Through its stable of international lawyers, IISD's
Investment Program advises governments on negotiation and implementation of international
investment treaties and contracts. IISD services and publications include the following:
•

Advice on drafting, negotiating and implementing international investment treaties and host
government contracts, as well as investment disputes at the pre-claim stage;

•

Preparation of legal opinions on international investment law;

•

Training for negotiators and government officials at the country-specific and regional levels;

•

Easy-to-use “Best Practices Bulletins” to fill gaps in existing literature and better inform
government officials;

•

Model Agreement on Investment, which provides insight into the creation of international
investment agreements, paying special attention to the rights and obligations of both the
investor and the host state.

ILFA is a program run by international law firms based in the United Kingdom which aims to assist
in the development of legal skills and expertise of African lawyers. ILFA provides, on a non-fee
based basis, a 3 month program (running from September to November each year), which
combines work experience through secondment to UK international law firms (20 firms are
involved to date), with training sessions in international law and key legal practice skills. The aim
is to build the capacity of African lawyers in the areas of public international law, corporate law
and international dispute resolution, to promote rule of law, create legal networks across African
countries and to keep legal work in Africa.
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Since its launch in 2006, 64 African lawyers have participated in the program, with lawyers from
17 countries in Africa competing for places - Botswana, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria,
Namibia, Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda,
Zambia and Zimbabwe. The program has been supported by Diageo, Associated British Foods
PLC, H.J Heinz, Hewlett Packard and the Commercial Bar Association.
Natural Resource Charter
Capacity building

The Natural Resource Charter provides a set of principles intended to aid policy makers in their
use of natural resources in order to promote optimal returns for citizens from the resources.

Oxford Policy Management(OPM)
Policy, financial expertise

OPM is an international development consultancy that enables strategic decision makers to
identify and implement sustainable solutions for reducing social and economic disadvantage. For
the extractive industries specifically, OPM conducts social and economic impact assessments and
advises donors and host country governments on revenue management and transparency, local
economic development, and development partnerships, among other related areas. Specifically,
the Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform (FOSTER), a five year program of support for
oil and gas sector reforms in Nigeria, funded by DFID is implemented by OPM In partnership with
Revenue Watch Institute and the Centre for the Study of Economies of Africa (CSEA). FOSTER is
currently providing support in a number of areas in the development of a new, revised legislative
framework that will govern the fiscal regime for future oil and gas production. This includes
providing technical and analytical support to help achieve consensus on a common approach by
working with the Ministry of Finance, key legislative committees in the upper and lower
legislatures, the main upstream and downstream regulatory agencies, the key petroleum unions,
and relevant civil society organizations and media institutions.

Pact
Capacity building

Pact has a natural resource management program through which it provides capacity building to
governments in relation to natural resource management, mostly in relation to planning and
frameworks.
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Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility
(PPIAF)
Infrastructure development, capacity building,
policy

PPIAF is a multi-donor trust fund (financed by 17 multilateral and bilateral donors) that provides
grants to governments in developing countries to allow them to obtain technical assistance
directed to the development of policy frameworks that facilitate private investment in
infrastructure, including with respect to policies, laws, regulations, institutions, and government
capacity. It also supports governments to develop specific infrastructure projects with private
sector participation.
PPIAF has a work program structured around three strategic pillars (universal access, climate
change, and urbanization) and four cross-cutting themes (sub-national technical assistance, fragile
states, regional integration, and capacity building).
Two-thirds of PPIAF’s support goes to low-income countries (that receive special consideration)
and half of PPIAF support goes to Africa. Eligible sectors include water and sanitation, solid waste
management, telecommunications, transport, energy, and irrigation.

Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG)
Infrastructure development

PIDG works in partnership with other donors, local operators and government bodies to mobilize
private sector investment, build infrastructure and increase funds for development.

SNR Denton LLP and ACT Financial Consulting LLC
Economic analysis

SNR Denton LLP and ACT Financial Consulting LLP are collaborating to develop a cloud-based
economic model for analyzing upstream petroleum project economics. The model will be made
available at no cost (a free user license) to emerging petroleum resource countries. The model will
incorporate many educational features that can be readily incorporated in cloud-based platforms.

Sustainable Development Strategies Group
(SDSG)
Capacity building, policy

SDSG is a group of researchers and consultants, based in Colorado, US. SDSG works with
governments, companies, communities and others to develop solutions and build capacity for
wise use and conservation of natural resources, for example, running capacity building workshops
for governments and communities and review of countries’ mining legislation, SDSG was involved
in the development of the Model Mine Development Agreement (with the IBA) and has more
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recently released a library of Community Development Agreements.
UNCTAD
Investment advice

Through its Division on Investment and Enterprise (DIAE), promotes understanding of, and helps
build consensus on matters related to foreign direct investment (FDI), transfer of technology and
development. DITE also helps developing countries attract and benefit from FDI and to build their
productive capacities and international competitiveness. Its Special Programme for Least
Developed, Landlocked and Island Developing Countries coordinates UNCTAD’s work in these
categories of countries, providing analyses of the broad development challenges facing these
countries and delivers technical assistance.

Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable
International Investment (VCC)
Policy, capacity building, contract review

A joint center of Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University, the VCC
undertakes applied research to inform policy formulation, particularly with respect to legal and
fiscal frameworks. The VCC has also been involved in review of a country’s model production
sharing contract and targeted capacity building workshops for government officials involved in
countries’ minerals sector.

World Bank Institute (WBI) – contracts database
Legal

Through its Governance Practice, the WBI is working with a number of partners to design and
develop an online, searchable database of extractive industries contracts, starting with subSaharan Africa. The project is collecting publicly available contracts and basic metadata on them
in order to categorize the content of a subset of these contracts in a standardized way, provide an
online interface for searching this collection, and serve as a central node to access and download
complete texts of contracts.
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Annex 3: Options for Structure and Governance, Financing Considerations
A. Structure and Governance
If a new initiative is to be created, whether as a coordinating mechanism, a complement to existing
initiatives, a new comprehensive negotiation support facility or a mechanism through which to
design and disseminate useful tools and resource to governments, there are a number of options to
be considered with respect to its structure and governance. These options will be explored in more
detail at a subsequent workshop, if it is determined that a new mechanism is desirable and feasible.
For the purpose of guiding an exploratory discussion at this workshop, a number of possible
structure and governance options are described in the section below. Existing arrangements are
illustrated to provide guidance on possible options for proceeding.
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Select Options for Institutional Setup and Governance
A.Multi-stakeholder
e.g. EITI

initiative,

B.International
e.g. ALSF

Organization,

C.Coordinating
Mechanism, e.g. ISLP

D. Public Interest Firm

E. Information
Forum, e.g. IGF

sharing
forum.

Organization
Form

Non Profit Association

International Organization

Non Profit Association

Either General partnership or Limited
liability company

Inter-governmental
Non-incorporated

Constituting
Document

Articles of Association

Treaty body
Agreement on the Establishment of
the Institution

Articles of Association

Partnership/ Limited Liability Company
Agreement

Terms of
binding)

Institution
Membership

Personal Representatives appointed
by constituency

States and International institutions

Members
Association

the

Partners or shareholders of public
Interest firm

Various – from States to firms
and NGOs

Institution: Yes

Institution: No
Members of Decision-making bodies:
No
Governing Council.

General partnership: Shared liability of
owners
Limited liability company: No direct
liability of shareholders

Institution and Members: No.

Members of Decision-Making Bodies:
Limited Liability
Members’
Meeting
(Multistakeholder)

Generally liability of the
members of a non-profit
association
Board of Directors

Depends on incorporating structure:
Partners or Board of Directors

Consultative Group

Multi-stakeholder board

Management Board

If this were to be an incorporated
entity, representatives of
governments, industry and civil
society could be invited into the
membership of the association and
vote on a weighted basis for the
members of a Board that would take
the major policy decisions.
Head of Secretariat

Director (Chief Executive Officer)

Executive Director

Managing Partner or CEO

Head of Secretariat

Regional structure which has the
potential to deliver a whole range of
support (legal and technical) also on
a global scale

A lean organization which
coordinates
effectively.
Able to draw upon highly
experienced
technical
advisors as need arises.

In-house professionals are able to
deliver fast and high quality advisory
services to governments

A
very
light
structure
appropriate for information
sharing

Liability

Governance/
Decisionmaking bodies

Management/
Administration
Key strength.

A multi-stakeholder structure can
foster collaboration. All relevant
stakeholders play a role in
determining the governance of the
initiative and strategic priorities,

of

Reference

(non-

Executive Board
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which confers buy-in and legitimacy.

9

Simpler to establish.

Multi-stakeholder governance may
create the necessary “space” for
donors to allow its trust funds to be
used in actual negotiation support.

Key weakness

In contrast, limited stakeholder
governance, which essentially
includes only the government (with
perhaps limited consultation of
industry or civil society) has the
advantage of easier and faster
decision-making and more efficient
working procedures.
Unless host countries consider they
have sufficient influence in the multistakeholder structure, it may lack
acceptance. Also, each stakeholder
group may have to accommodate
different views in its own
constituency and reach agreement
before it can take those views
forward in discussion with others.10

Being subject to treaty law the
structure can be unwieldy (e.g.,
accession to a treaty of new
members necessary). For example,
the founding of ALSF took years, even
with the support of the professional
resources of the AfDB Legal
department.

A lower level of
transparency as compared
to the first two options may
impede fund raising. There
is little or no legal
protection of directors.

It may be more difficult for a public
interest firm to deliver a whole range
of support (including technical) across
many countries

An inter-governmental forum
such as IGF cannot deliver
entire range of required
support.

The disadvantages of limited
stakeholder governance are that if
the initiative becomes dominated by
one player only, it has less legitimacy
and buy-in from the other players,
and may therefore be less
transparent in its support overall.

9

See http://www.eiti.org

10

See Mariëtte van Huijstee. (2012). Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives. A strategic guide for civil society organizations. Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations. The Netherlands
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B. Financial aspects
Any approach going forwards will require financing. The nature and structure of the approach will
influence the nature of the funding that is sought and available. There are many funding options
that can be considered, a number of which are described below. Any mechanism or combination of
mechanisms will require funding from one or a number of these (or additional) options, described
below for the purpose of the exploratory discussions. Any real decision on financing to be sought will
be discussed at a later workshop, depending on the outcome of the discussions at this workshop.
Donor support The key issue is whether funds for negotiation support can be raised directly from
donors, perhaps in the form of a revolving fund.
Cost recovery Cost recovery from host countries after successful negotiations (at least part of the
total cost) would be very desirable, not only for the financial sustainability of the initiative but also
to ensure quality of service and appreciation of value by recipients. In this regard, the experience of
the ALSF will be interesting.
Cost recovery from investors There are a number of models that may be used which require the
investor to cover the government’s costs in retaining experts. Recovering costs from investors
requires careful consideration of an institutional model to ensure transparency in the selection and
terms of retention of advisers. One option is for the costs paid for by the investor to be considered
as a part of the recoverable costs of the investor in determining the “split” of contract economics
between the investor and the state. Another model could require (as a contractual term and a
precondition to the government entering into negotiations) that the investor agrees to an annual
payment from project revenues towards the cost of the government retaining advisers. In terms of
institutional models to deal with the receipt of investor funding for payment of advisers, one
example may be a “clearing house” organization to administer the process, ensuring transparent
selection of advisors and to serve as the “pay master” for disbursements to such advisors to ensure
they remain effectively insulated from investor pressure which could give rise to conflicts of interest.
Another example could be a facility that covers the costs of retaining lawyers and other professional
advisors to represent the government, administering the selection of advisors with the host
government, and receives an annual payment from the investor’s project revenues to the facility.
The facility would recover costs but would not be tied to costs – the annual payment would
ultimately contribute to resources (in effect by way of endowment). Both of these options would
initially require donor assistance for their establishment and initial engagements but the funding
option would aim over time to eliminate the need for donor support
Direct fund raising A further option might be to help governments to raise funds themselves.
Offering a plausible system of selecting, instructing and supervising experts for funding by bilateral
or multilateral funding agencies might be a practical way to proceed in this regard. In the case of
EITI, a combination of donor support and direct funding has been successful.
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